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Maritime Cyber-Security Policy: The Scope and Impact of Evolving 
Technology on International Shipping  
Kimberly Tam and Kevin D. Jones 
ABSTRACT 
As the global maritime industry becomes increasingly dependent on advancing technology, it 
is important for the world to be more aware of, and understand, the possible scope and 
impacts cyberattacks can have on international shipping. This article explores the maritime-
cyber landscape for security flaws related to the area of maritime operations with an 
emphasis on the system technology involved, how their vulnerabilities enable attacks with 
cyber elements, and possible outcomes.  As ships become more sophisticated and connected, 
in order to meet the demands of shipping 90 per cent of the world’s goods, the cyber risks 
increase. This article aims to analyse compressively the unique nature of maritime cyber and 
cyber-physical threats to influence maritime cyber policies and improve global fleet security 
by suggesting adjustments and additions to current codes and policy to cover more 
comprehensively  cyber and cyber-physical risks. 
Keywords: maritime; policy; cybersecurity 
Introduction 
Due to the nature of maritime- based travel and environments, modern ship technology 
is significantly different from both typical computing systems and traditional maritime 
tools. To understand the unique scope and impact of cyberattacks on the shipping 
industry, this article analyses traditional cyberattacks in conjunction with knowledge of 
modern maritime technology to present a range of plausible maritime cyberattack 
scenarios.  We conclude this examination of cyber vulnerabilities and outcomes, 
specific to the shipping industry, by suggesting improvements to maritime cyber policy 
and demonstrating their potential improvements. This is key for global security (i.e. 
economic, physical and social) as the maritime industry is roughly 20 years behind 
equivalent sectors in terms of cybersecurity (Belmont 2016). 
The scenarios provided in this article illustrate a range of possible maritime 
cyberattacks, as a complete list is still being compiled due to insufficient data on global 
fleet equipment and practices. A number of maritime cyber incidents have also not been 




However, the threat is real, as illustrated by recent pen-testing and known cyberattacks 
(AJOT 2017), (Maersk 2017).  Since these incidents only highlight a narrow set of 
technical vulnerabilities and possible outcomes, this article seeks to widen the scope of 
understanding by exploring the evolution of maritime systems into the cyber domain, 
including emerging trends within autonomous or remotely controlled vessels, and the 
potential impacts. This in turn informs our policymaking decisions within the 
increasingly intertwined maritime and cybersecurity fields. 
In the past, attacks like piracy were a common threat and so physical defences 
are well understood. In contrast, modern cyber and cyber-physical attacks aimed at 
ships are significantly less understood and, therefore, less preventable with current 
codes and practices.  The stealth ability and long attack durations of newer cyberattacks 
increases the number of cyberthreats in general, including maritime cyberthreats 
(BIMCO 2016), (Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty 2016). Such maritime 
cyberattack impacts include (1) business disruption,  (2) theft of information, finance 
and cargo, and (3) damage to reputation, goods and environment.  As ships grow 
increasingly automated, perhaps even achieving full automation within five years 
(Bruxelles 2016), these threats must be better defined and policy shaped to prevent 
future incidences. 
This article analyses cyber vulnerabilities of significant maritime technologies. 
Cyberattack scenarios are then constructed from these known vulnerabilities to 
demonstrate plausible exploits and outcomes.  With a better understanding of the scope 
of problems and impacts, this article analyses the state of maritime-cyber policy today 
and proposes changes to improve global maritime cybersecurity.   
Background 
The maritime sector is a critical component of global trade infrastructure and 
transportation.  Furthermore, the significant amount of shipping-based travel crossing 
national lines creates an interesting geopolitical dimension to maritime cybersecurity, 
due to separate nations and their policies (Germond 2015).  These policies, and any 
future policies, are heavily influenced by a nation’s economic goals, environment goals, 
and other considerations.  Maritime transportation as a sector, therefore, poses a unique 
cyber security problem.   Shipping also differs from other modes of transportation, such 




trip durations (months versus hours), and cargo volume.  Thus, just as risk analyses 
differ between airplanes and trains due to each sector’s unique characteristics, it is 
equally important to explore maritime cyberthreats, risks and vulnerabilities from a 
maritime  
 
perspective.  That said, while different sectors make use of different systems (e.g. 
ECDIS, AIS) similarities in technology (e.g. radio-based) can be used to predict how 
the threats and threat outcomes will be different depending on the system or sector.  For 
example, a similar vulnerability can exist in nuclear facilities and satellites, yet the 
exploitation of that vulnerability, and therefore the potential cyberthreat and outcome, 
are unlikely to be the same because of dissimilar system purposes (Unal and Lewis 
2018).   
However, one of the biggest differences between maritime cybersecurity and 
security in other sectors, is how comparatively poorly it is understood (Belmont 2016).  
This makes a comprehensive comparison of sector security difficult, but can be 
improved if maritime cyber incidences are better reported, as we hope the policy 
suggestions in this paper will enable.  As shown below, these policies are aimed to 
mitigate cyber, and cyber-physical risks, which are different to the purely physical risks 
the maritime sector has primarily encountered so far.  The range of a cyberattack 
increases the risks, as well as the increased anonymity of the attacker and the confusing 
prosecution laws for cybercrime. The assessment of risk, however, is not the goal of this 
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paper and for those interested in understanding the malicious players relating to 
maritime cyber and risk assessment, we refer to (BIMCO 2016) and (Tam and Jones 
2018b). 
From passenger ferries to large container ships sailing on international waters, 
the vast majority of all ships share at least two fundamental functions: navigation and 
propulsion, both of which are supported by a plethora of hardware and increasingly 
advanced software controls. Standard navigation systems like Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS), Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), and Electronic Chart Display 
and Information Systems (ECDIS) have increased physical safety through international 
regulation. However, with their technological advances come new cyberattack vectors 
to exploit and attack ships (Balduzzi 2014), (Coffeid 2014) and (AJOT 2017).   A block 
diagram of several main ship-based systems can be found in Figure 1. 
For historical reasons existing policies have primarily been designed for 
physical safety and efficient operations, not for addressing cyber or cyber-physical 
security. However, recent internationally standardised systems (several examples in 
Figure 1) increase the cyberattack surface of ships across the globe.  As these systems 
are already known to have vulnerabilities, the arrival of remote-controlled and 
autonomous ships in the near future, is likely to intensify the effect of cyberattacks 
going forward.   
Other industries, like rail (RSSB 2016), have developed cyberdefences to 
accommodate variances in their unique operations and environment, just as malware has 
been adapted to compromise systems in different industries.  Given this, policies and 
technology defences developed for other industries would be based on assumptions 
inappropriate for shipping (e.g. banks are stationary and flights are less than 20 hours).  
This paper aims to understand the key dissimilarities of maritime cyber and, from that, 
shape effective security strategies. Several significant differences that set ships apart are 
their movement across international boundaries, the duration of their voyages (may be 
months), the average age of ships (20.3 years (International Chamber of Shipping 
2016)), the mix of old and new systems, a nominally low bandwidth while at sea, and 
alternating between extreme isolation and global connectivity at international ports.  
As previously mentioned, due to their mobility, ships are often difficult to secure 
using solutions or policies borrowed from other industries.  Firstly, any physical or 
software-based security would have to be much more robust, as physical ship movement 




international lines (e.g. geopolitics).  Secondly, crew turnover and port interfacing make 
the physical and training aspects of cybersecurity especially challenging.  Long voyages 
can also create large windows of opportunities for physical, cyber and cyber-physical 
attacks.  
Unlike most onshore systems, ship builds and ship life cycles are much longer.  
Due to this, the certification of systems often support technology that are well-known 
but would be considered obsolete in other areas. Obsolete but certified hardware leads 
to the continued use of unsecure software. For example, Windows XP is not the most 
secure Windows operating system and organizations are highly encouraged to upgrade 
for security purposes.  However, many ships cannot upgrade because of outdated 
hardware, which cannot easily be updated since there is a need to use devices that have 
been through appropriate certification standards for critical systems.  As a result, the 
Royal and US Navies, have paid Microsoft to continue support for XP after Microsoft 
discontinued it (Goldman 2015).  While upgrades have now been made, other ships are 
still vulnerable through legacy hardware, and the design cycle of newer ships are long 
enough that this problem will likely continue to exist. 
The projected future of shipping, although driven by potential cost savings and 
better work environments for mariners, adds further intricacies as remote crews and 
autonomous ships will further complicate the maritime threat landscape and introduce a 
wider scope of possible attack outcomes and impacts (Bruxelles 2016) and (Shaikh 
2017).  By examining future and current technologies, the scenarios of the following 
section analyse what policy changes can increase cybersafety against a range of possible 
attacks and outcomes facing the evolving shipping industry.  These primarily focus on 
ships, because even though port security is a major issue, it is better understood due its 
similarities with existing onshore infrastructure (IMO 2003). In comparison, securing a 
maritime vessel is significantly less understood and, as the potential weak link, must be 
addressed to secure global transportation infrastructure and for those who depend on it.  
Maritime cyberthreat scenarios 
This section describes several cyberattack scenarios based on known vulnerabilities in 
technology. While not real-world examples, the plausibility of these scenarios has been 
discussed with experienced mariners and extrapolated from known system 




survey responses from cybersecurity and maritime experts (contacted through existing 
contacts in both the security and maritime sectors) asked them to rank certain maritime 
system vulnerabilities within our scenarios as low, medium or high risks.  For the ease 
of the reader, the referenced scenarios themselves can be found in Appendix A and are 
referenced by number within this section.  This article discusses how known 
vulnerabilities have been exploited in technologically similar systems and demonstrates 
how events and system flaws can be exploited maliciously instead of triggered 
accidentally. With few past incidences to support the scenarios, supporting material to 
provide authenticity and plausibility are given. Scenarios also incorporate social factors 
as well as upcoming, near-future technology for a wider scope.  
Although some of the resulting scenarios may seem a little extreme, they were 
designed to define the boundaries of plausible maritime cyberattacks and impact. They 
therefore illustrate various cyber-attacks, whether directly targeted by hackers, 
malicious software (i.e. malware) written by an attacker, or insider threats created by 
social engineering.  Summaries, of scenario vulnerabilities and effects, cyber and cyber 
physical, can be found in Figures 2 and 4, which are organized based on a maritime 
cyber-risk assessment framework (Tam and Jones 2018b) and a breakdown of how 




Malware can be easily installed physically by a variety of devices, including those not 
even capable of downloading content (e.g, an e-cigarette), via any port capable of 
reading data.   In the first scenario, a USB port on the main integrated bridge system 
(IBS) computer is exploited.  As a universal technology, the widely used USB is often 
the prime choice for physical malware infection (Maskiewicz, et al. 2014). In Scenario 
1, a newly purchased USB drive held pre-installed malware, which was undetected. 
Today, introducing an infected device to the ship’s bridge systems would be most easily 
achieved via social engineering, such as strategic product placement near or at shipping 
ports with low prices, which has been done previously to target similar systems using 
smartphones, as has been done in real life (Sulleyman 2017) and  (Palmer 2017).  Hence 
it is highly plausible that preinstalled, customized malware could corrupt maritime data 




USB could have little to no visible symptoms until the primary target is reached and 
attacked.  Stuxnet is a state-level threat, likely performed by a state-level actor.  Any 
vulnerability may be exploited, with the right level of resources, with a range of 
outcomes and severity depending on the vulnerability and the malicious actors (Tam 
and Jones 2018b) and (Shaikh 2017).     
The specific malware type in Scenario 1, as seen in the Appendix section, is a 
command and control bot, many of which exist today, which can transmit stolen data 
back to the hacker and obey commands.  Its moderate bandwidth activity may exceed 
ship capacity, slowing systems, but may go undetected without sufficient network 
analysis. Today, most cyberattacks are designed stealthily to prolong the exploit. 
However, in this scenario, the unintentional corruption of the charts had a noticeable 
impact and could have led to the malware’s discovery if the right policies, checklists or 
training had been in place.  
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are a generalization of the cyber knowledge above 
applied to ships, current-day and near-future (Tam and Jones 2018a), and a few known 
incidents where maritime systems were compromised by malware from a USB device 
(Santamarta 2015) and via the internet (Sin 2013) in real life. With autonomy, the 
duration of unmanned voyages means more devices are updated at sea via the internet 
without human supervision or verification. Therefore, areas where shipboard policy and 
practice can be improved would be the prevention of infection with effective ‘BYOD’ 
and software update policy, as well as operation policy for mitigating the impacts of a 
successful attack with crew response training and computer-based intrusion and 
recovery solutions. Lastly, while malware infections aimed at significant systems (e.g. 
ECIS) could give an attacker more and quicker access, such an attack would be more 
difficult to achieve as the supply chain for important systems are likely to be more 
secure and closely monitored.  Therefore an attacker may compromise a low-profile 
system first, like a USB device, meaning all systems must be protected for robust ship 
security. 
 
Effect System Vulnerability 
Theft ECDIS Computer 
Damage IBS Satellite 
Denial of Service Anemometer Ultrasonic 
Figure 2. Malware scenario involving specific technological systems, known cyber 





Signal jamming devices are relatively small and inexpensive to make or obtain, thus it 
would not be difficult to introduce a satellite or radio signal jammer to a ship heading to 
a dangerous hotspot like the Malacca Straits, a high flow area with high pirate activity. 
This is because, technologically speaking, it is easy to prevent signals from reaching 
their destinations by concentrating noise near the targeted receiver or emitter and cause 
signal congestion.   Jamming is particularly effective on ships, as they are often very far 
from other signal sources, making those signals very weak and easy to jam theoretically 
and in practice (Coffeid 2014).  A spectrum of frequencies, all of which can be jammed 
if the frequency range is known, can be found in Figure 3. General use examples of 
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Figure 3. General use examples of different frequencies and their jamming ranges. 
In Scenario 3, the attackers were able to use social engineering to introduce a 
GPS and radio jammer to the ship.  Social engineering may currently be the simplest 
way; however, attacks higher up the supply chain can also compromise a device or 
legitimate device update to introduce malicious hardware or software.  Moreover, while 
social engineering may be hit and miss, popular ports with multiple targets would 
significantly increase the chances of a successful attack. Once introduced, jamming 
devices can be remotely controlled or given instructions (e.g. time or location) to 
activate at the most opportune moment. Even with a basic jammer onboard, 
cyberattacks can be extremely effective in disabling a ship as it may be unable to leave 
the jamming zone, update charts, or communicate effectively until the malicious device 
is disabled.  While it can be very difficult to mitigate jamming threats with technology, 
operational policy could significantly prevent social engineering and detect unusual ship 




In Scenario 4 of Appendix A, a shore-based attacker was able to use a jammer 
hidden in a large land-based vehicle.  This lowers the attack’s difficulty and risk of the 
attacker getting caught, but also lowers the number of available ship targets.  Again, 
while it can be difficult to prevent these attacks with purely technological solutions, as 
jamming is a low-effort high-impact attack (Tam and Jones 2018b), changing policies 
and detailed checklists could greatly aid mariners in deterring, mitigating, and 
accurately reporting maritime cyberattacks like jamming. While there are reports of 
land-based jammers (Thomson 2013), the lack of robust reporting means there is no 
citable evidence for ocean-based instances, although there is anecdotal evidence of GPS 
jamming interfering with ships, particularly ferries transporting stolen cars. Today, 
several available automated mooring systems use radio-based remote controls to 
activate and deactivate the mooring system (MacGregor 2017).  Generalizing from this, 
it is possible for an attacker to deploy similar land-based jamming for radio frequencies 
(see Figure 3). Furthermore, as auto-mooring systems are solely reliant on jammable 
wireless transmissions, and have no wired alternative, an attack could be highly 
effective.   
 
Effect System Vulnerability 
Theft GPS Satellite 
Damage GMDSS Radio 




Denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities 
While some ships still carry analogue or hardwired systems (e.g., CAN, WAN, CANES 
and WSNs), as ships get larger, more advanced, and saturated with devices, many 
connect transmitters, repeaters, and sensors via network packet transmission. Generally 
speaking, today’s ships are installing increasing numbers of sensors for monitoring 
cargo and ship functions to increase safety and efficiency (Yingjum, et al. 2010).  In 
addition to that, future ships are more reliant on sensor data for computer-based 
decisions.  This makes them particularly susceptible to denial of service (DoS) attacks 
Figure 4. Jamming scenario involving specific technological systems, their known 




(Tam and Jones 2018a). While a physical DoS attack could be damaging sensors and/or 
transmitter hardware, Scenario 5 explores a plausible cyber-physical attack that 
proposed policy development should help prevent if properly implemented.  
Specifically, in Scenario 5, a sensor network overload denies the bridge access to 
wireless rudder readings. Therefore, while the physical steering gear is operating 
normally, the bridge-mounted rudder angle indicator misleads the crew to thinking there 
is a physical rudder issue. If timed well, such an attack could have significant 
consequences.  Many ships today lack secure network segregation or access control 
(BIMCO 2016) and malicious access to these networks can be achieved with 
compromised devices or crew members. 
In Scenario 5, the compromised sensors flooded a non-segregated network with 
garbage data to slow legitimate packets, such as signals reporting rudder angles, from 
reaching the bridge on time.  In cases where the network bandwidth can withstand the 
rogue sensor output, or the network is somewhat secure, a more sophisticated attacker 
may attempt other network-based attacks.  For example, capturing and replaying 
packets could send contradictory signals to the bridge, which would be particularly 
effective in a UDP network, delaying or scrambling packets, and modifying packets.  
Additionally, altering an already connected device, attaching a new device, or gaining 
access to a network gateway may also be effective cyberattacks with a DoS impact.  
These network-based attacks are well known, and are still effective when used on well-
protected systems, and would therefore be effective on ships as well (Hoque 2014).  
In Scenario 6, a direct attack could also be made to the propulsion instead 
delaying network packets to the rudder angle indicator.  Demand for new, economically 
friendly fuel has grown; however, incidences surrounding the storage and use of these 
fuels have also increased (Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty 2016).  As sensors are 
required to measure and maintain fuel, and its data sent to the bridge or engineroom for 
analysis, network attacks can cause a myriad of exploits from a stall to an explosion by 
altering such data.  As these systems evolve, it is essential that the technical 
vulnerabilities are mitigated or at least understood so that policy regarding cyberattack 
response can be made in conjunction. Also, as ships enter new environments (i.e. water 
tunnels), checklists, hygiene, and communication protocols must be set up to reduce the 
new associated risks. For both of these scenarios, as they map directly from denial of 




were to consider scenario variations, a mapping may be necessary to organize the 
possibilities. 
Spoofing vulnerabilities 
Spoofing (i.e. providing false data) is typically more sophisticated than jamming as it 
requires an understanding of the transmission protocols.  However, the pay-off of 
spoofing instead of jamming is that the absence of a GPS signal often results in ship-
wide alarms, whereas misdirection is less noticeable and can cause more subtle 
outcomes. In Scenario 7, saboteurs introduced a GPS spoofing device to the ship’s 
environment.  This was achieved by altering cargo manifests to define the malicious 
device as legitimate cargo to be loaded, similar to criminal smuggling activity in the 
past (Pasternack 2013).  Generalizing from this incident, attackers could smuggle cargo 
containing spoofing devices onto vulnerable ships, specifically a cargo container in 
Scenario 7. Real attackers in this area have recently become much more technologically 
sophisticated, even using 3D printing to forge cargo seals after accessing shipping 
containers (CART 2017).  
It is also likely that with the time it takes to manufacture a vessel, there is ample 
opportunity to try different approaches to sabotage the vessel for a desired impact.  
While such attacks require better planned and technologically advanced attacks in the 
current state of maritime security, the monetary incentive to do so would be higher.  In 
the case of competing company sabotage, such attackers would also likely have the 
resources to develop and deploy high-level attacks (Tam and Jones 2018b) and be able 
to execute a direct attack or one further up the supply chain to compromise a ship build 
pre-launch.  Scenario 7 primarily demonstrates the possible outcomes from spoofing 
ship systems; however, a ship also relies on external shore-stored information and 
systems, which can also be spoofed to deploy a cyberattack without needing to 
compromise specific ships. 
Generally speaking, virtual anti-collision beacons known as eAtoN beacons use 
traditional AIS technology to help navigate ships in locations where physical buoys 
cannot be used (reefs, ice routes, etc.) or low-visibility situations.  There have been 
several studies on how to spoof and jam AIS broadcasts, and since there is no physical 
aspect to virtual AIS beacons, it makes it even harder to spot misleading information 




more cyber-related system (eAtoN) is just one example of how maritime cyber 
encompasses an interesting blend of new, old, maritime, and traditional technology.  
While the technology of eAtoNs can still be improved, as it is a relatively new 
application of AIS, policy can also be made to lessen the impact if this system is 
compromised. For example, if crew can accurately identify cyberattacks, protocols 
could enable fast communication ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship in order to quickly 
locate and fix these external vulnerabilities to prevent other potential incidences. 
Isolation of systems deemed non-trustworthy may also prevent cascading failures and 
remove untrustworthy information from crew decision-making. Extrapolating from 
these technologies and known vulnerabilities we present Scenario 7 and Scenario 8. 
 
Maritime cyber policy 
As of 2018 the global implementation of robust maritime cybersecurity policy is 
essentially non-existent. One of the first analysis of the maritime cybersecurity state was 
in 2013 when the EU reported that, not only was there an international lack of maritime 
cybersecurity awareness, but existing policy catered to purely physical aspects of 
security and safety (ENSIA 2011).  Despite some effort, it was not until recent attacks 
that there has been a real drive to design and put in place policy to counteract maritime 
cyber-attacks (Gallangher 2017).  In this section we will discuss several phases of 
policy improvement that are proposed, based on the scenarios presented, that would 
significantly increase cybersecurity in the maritime community.   
Firstly, it is the opinion of the authors that it would be sensible to start changes 
by adapting physical policies for cyber-physical security, as there already exist 
extensive efforts for physical maritime security.  As this article has illustrated, it is 
likely that a significant portion of low-level attacks  in the near-future will have a cyber-
physical element, as opposed to entirely cyber-based.  That said, it is likely that more 
sophisticated cyberattacks will arise as technology continues to evolve and be used. 
Secondly, this article discusses policymaking that can be used to prevent cyberattacks 
from occurring; and lastly, we discuss policies to assist crew, and other organizations 






Attack Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Cyber  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Cyber-Physical ✔    ✔ ✔   
Social Engineering ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
 
Table 1. Primary attack categories per scenario. 
 
Most of today’s global maritime policies are produced by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO 2018), a specialized agency of the United Nations 
responsible for regulating shipping.  The IMO has many partners, such as government 
departments for transportation, and subgroups for various aspects of shipping.  Many 
international standards for maritime are defined by the IMO International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  This includes the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code, an amendment of SOLAS, which addresses some 
cybersecurity concerns.  For example, the ISPS Code requires a ship security plan every 
five years. However, as discussed, the pace at which maritime technology evolves and 
becomes interconnected raises the question whether this would be effective and what 
changes will allow policies to be more flexible and effective as time passes. 
Cyber-physical policy 
As IMO policies provide smooth international shipping practices and prevent many 
physical accidents each year, and as these have been well tested and improved upon, 
relatively small additions to, or re-definitions of, existing policy could be a significant 
first step toward better maritime physical-cyber security.  Adaptions to well-established 
codes for physical security could address the following cyber-physical risks.  Despite 
varying malicious attackers, targeted systems, or outcome severity, we feel the 
following three categories are a sensible way to classify and address different cyber-
physical threats: 
 
 Physical attacks with a cyber element or outcome to improve success rate or 




 Cyberattack made possible with a physical action first;  
 Cyberattack with a physical outcome such as a collision or cargo theft. 
 
Attacks in the third category can be mitigated by policies suggested to address 
the first two categories, details below. 
 
Physical attacks with a cyber element 
The effects of cyberattacks or cyber-assisted attacks have already had an influence on 
policy, although sparsely in a few specific cases.  Most significantly, with attackers 
abusing AIS to target ships (Balduzzi 2014), IMO policy has changed its strict 
mandatory policy to allow ship masters to turn off their AIS if it made them vulnerable, 
particularly in hotspots where piracy and armed robbery on ships are likely (IMO 2011).  
By improving technology, it may become possible to anonymize or secure identification 
information in these cases instead of disabling AIS; however, that may not be enough. 
That is why this article discusses possible changes to existing policy, particularly those 
designed for physical attacks, so that they also encompass similar attacks with cyber 
elements. This may include using intelligence collected from the internet, preventing 
communication (i.e. jam frequencies), and bypassing physical security (e.g. locks).   
As an example, the UK Department for Transportation wrote guidance for the 
physical security related to piracy and other physical acts of violence against merchant 
shipping (Department for Transport 2011). This article uses the MGN 420(M) 
governmental policy of using armed guards to increase a ship’s physical security but it 
can be adapted to incorporate cyber-physical attacks.  For instance, it is recommended 
that guards and crew are aware of radio procedures and watch-keeping.  
 
Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred, OOWs should practice and perfect 
all appropriate radio operational procedures and ensure all transmitters, including 
satellite ship earth stations are fully operational and available for immediate use on 
distress and safety frequencies (Department for Transport 2011). 
 
 However, in the case of a jamming attack, fully functional equipment may not 
be able to fulfil the communication needs of the crew, but existing policy can be 




recognize frequency-jamming attacks, and practices or checklists can determine a 
sequence of alternative communication channels to try until a connection is made.  This 
would be effective as jamming techniques are unlikely to be able to jam the full 
spectrum constantly and can be bypassed once the attack is understood (Tam and Jones 
2018b).  Therefore, with a small adjustment to operations, ships can better counter such 
attacks.  Secondly, policy and protocols can be modified so that prior to entering 
dangerous zones, a ship can send out periodical, covert, signals to onshore authorities.  
If that signal is cut off before the ship is known to be safe, it can be assumed that the 
ship is in distress, unable to communicate, and likely requires further action.  These 
policies could help prevent or mitigate situations similar to the presented Scenario 3 and 
Scenario 4 (see Table 2). 
 Similarly, onboard crew or guards can be trained to prevent information leaks or 
social-based attacks, as they may provide attackers with useful information for a cyber-
physical attack.  For example, in one real world incident, because the crew of a ship 
were aware of an information leak, they were able to make course changes to mitigate 
the chances of an encounter in the Gulf of Eden, a known hot spot for such attacks 
(CyberKeel 2014).  If this, or any other ship, were to have a physical encounter, it could 
then rely on physical safety such as locked doors to secure critical points and systems, 
such as the communication transceivers mentioned earlier.  Therefore, any policy 
concerning these defences should also include cyberattack mitigation, such as PIN 
protection for doors and secure backup power to essential systems.  We suggest the 
following suggestions to improve protections against physical attacks with a cyber 
element: 
 
4.1.1.1: Crew training to recognize jamming attack; 
4.1.1.2: Crew training to mitigate attacks with checklists and processes; 
4.1.1.3: Enhancement of physical lockdown policy to include cyber lockdown. 
 
Cyberattack made possible with a physical action 
In general, the remote nature of ships can add a degree of cybersecurity.  However, that 
security is severely reduced if a physical attack can overcome air-gaps and bypass local 
security.  Typical cyber hygiene will deter the connection of most USB devices to ship 




compromising security, as devices are often needed for software updates and broad 
rules may be ignored for convenience.  If easily accessible and secure USB charging 
stations were provided, codes could state that all personal devices could only be charged 
at those locations.  These isolated stations would protect systems with USB ports 
without inconveniencing crew.  Firstly, this would add flexibility to the policy, as the 
number, types and dependency of USB-powered devices continue to grow (e.g. 
smartphones, cameras, e-cigarettes).  Secondly, policy could dictate that USB meant for 
bridge or engineering need routine scans and checks, just as other systems do for 
physical safety, to reduce infection risks. Thirdly, policy could also assign specific uses 
for a set of USB drives to minimize attack vectors, a policy which may have helped 
prevent the attack in Scenario 1. 
 USB only represents one possible physical connection that can be used to make 
a cyberattack easier and, as existing physical-security policies are often significant aids 
in preventing unauthorized access to various access points on systems, it is likely that 
organizations can slightly alter current practices to ensure that critical access points to 
onboard computing systems and critical connections between systems are physically 
secured.  This should decrease cyber-physical attacks by insider threats, saboteurs, and 
insecure interactions with other entities, such as port infrastructure and data networks. 
Furthermore, if implemented in conjunction with network security, this could 
significantly mitigate the attacks suggested in Scenario 2, Scenario 5, Scenario 6 and 
Scenario 7, as both malicious physical and virtual access would be limited. Based on 
these potential attack scenarios for cyberattacks that are possible due to a physical 
action, we suggest the following policy changes.  Table 2 also maps these policy 
suggestions to the Appendix A cyberattack scenarios that they may have been able to 
prevent or mitigate. 
 
4.1.2.1: Allowed device connection policy; 
4.1.2.2: Secure alternatives for charging and device network connections; 
4.1.2.3: Separation of networks and devices with defined privilege regions. 
 
Of the suggested policies, 4.1.2.1 – 4.1.2.3 resemble existing cyber policy the 
most and are similar to existing and in-draft cyber hygiene for ships (IET 2017) and  




which provide robust security without limiting mariners (e.g. approved USB charging 
stations) while effectively considering both cyber and physical cyberthreats. 
Cyber policy for prevention 
This section discusses directions maritime cyber practices can take in order to prevent 
cyberthreats from manifesting and to improve general maritime cyber defences.  Some 
suggestions will build on the previous section of cyber-physical security, a proposed 
first step due to overlaps with traditional, well-established physical security. However,  
to consider future threats the following sections aim to prevent and mitigate maritime 
cyberattacks, particularly those concerning sophisticated and primarily cyber-based 
attacks.  These will be more useful going forward, as maritime technology continues to 
evolve towards goals such as autonomy and remote control.  
As alluded to in the previous sections, isolation can be used to secure different 
systems and networks from each other.  This includes power and data networks.  With 
the addition of physical security at critical access points, sensible policy for the 
interface of ship systems with other entities (e.g. USB, SCADA) makes it easier to 
continuously defend against, and prevent, maritime cyberattacks. This can build up 
from existing cyber-hygiene suggestions and adapt from existing policy for physical 
safety.  For example, ships often have redundant navigation systems such as ECDIS 
(ECDIS info 2018) or SONAR.  However, it is important from a cybersecurity 
perspective that identical systems do not share exact vulnerabilities, or else redundancy 
will only protect against accidents, not intentional cyberattacks.  As seen in Scenario 4, 
a second auto-mooring trigger system like a hardwired trigger instead of relying solely 
on wireless transmissions could have mitigated the attack. 
Unlike ship-based maritime security, port-based security has recently been more 
scrutinized and developed.  For example, H.R.2878 Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
at Ports Bill and (IMO 2003) have policy for information security within ports. 
However, these often exclude detailed policy to prevent spreading cyber-risks ship-to-
shore, vice versa, and ship-to-ship. Just as personnel and cargo are examined for 
physical threats like explosives (see below), it is equally important to create policies to 
screen electronics for malware and note the changes in risk and vulnerabilities during 
loading and unloading of hardware, software and data.  Such policies may include 




checksums to detect malicious additions, or the software version of trustworthy, well-
tested, antivirus and firewall solutions. 
 
Prevent access to the port by persons without a legitimate reason to be there and 
prevent those persons with legitimate reasons to be in the port from gaining illegal 
access to ships or other restricted port areas for the purpose of committing unlawful acts 
(IMO 2003). 
 
Crew and onshore management can also receive cyber-awareness training and be taught 
governance procedures concerning the maritime information and operational technology 
(IT/OT) of ship systems.  This is particularly important for crew on semi-autonomous 
ships or those who will be using remote access to perform operations. As demonstrated 
in all the scenarios above, crew awareness could decrease the probability of a 
cyberattack.  Furthermore, well-trained crew or hired guards can actively detect and 
mitigate an attack if it were to actually occur.  This is especially important when 
considering more sophisticated attacks, such as the one in Scenario 8, as an attack may 
not be easily preventable and only present a small window for averting further 
incidents, if even detected.  Suggested policy changes for cyberattack prevention are: 
 
4.1.3.1: Appropriate cyber awareness training specific to ship installed systems; 
4.1.3.2: Appropriate policy for interaction between ship and shore-based 
systems;  
4.1.3.3: Clear lines of responsibility for individual IT and OT systems; 
4.1.3.4: Established communication/alerts for cyber incidences and concerns. 
 
Crew training IMO resolution A.1079 (28) must be adhered to in any suggested 
training programs under these policies.  Moreover, the creation of any security-related 
alarm regarding ship control and safety must meet International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 61508 and 62443 standards, while onshore office-level management 
security alerts must operate under typical security policies under the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27000 series of documents.  When considering 
existing standards, the categorization of cyber, cyber-physical, and system 
vulnerabilities in this article can be useful in structuring policy more effective and 




Cyber policy for mitigation 
Currently there exist policies for continuing operations despite system failure.  
However, during a cyberattack, a system that is not working properly is not necessarily 
broken (e.g., jammed communications in Scenario 3) and a working system is not 
necessarily providing trustworthy data (e.g., GPS spoof in Scenario 7).  Therefore, 
policies and operation checklists should account for these possibilities, instead of only 
considering something as functioning or non-functioning. Understanding the difference 
is essential as cyberattacks can blur the line and cause both human and machine 
confusion.   It is also important that policies mitigate the damage from compromised 
systems, such as system isolation or shutdown.  Other courses of action may be to repair 
untrustworthy systems or proper reporting to local authorities, higher management and 
IT/OT departments. 
Reporting is an interesting subject when concerning maritime cyberattacks.  
Currently there are dedicated channels and codes for communicating emergencies and 
incidents.  However, it is unclear whether these practices should be used for 
cyberattacks, or if it would be better to introduce new codes and channels specifically to 
report cyber-related incidents and attacks, especially if the range of attacks and malware 
reach the levels seen in typical computing systems.  It is possible that entirely new 
codes, and even communication technologies, will be essential in the future if the 
current options prove to be insufficient to support the cyber scenarios. Once maritime 
cyber incidences receive better reporting, faster effective responses can be made to 
reduce risks further. 
Like prevention, the mitigation of cyberattacks in the maritime community must be 
adaptable to new attacks as they arise.  This includes being adaptable to new technology 
solutions that prevent or mitigate jamming, spoofing, etc. More specifically, new 
policies will need to be derived to determine when and how new defences should be 
used, maintained, and protected. As mentioned, this is particularly important as remote 
control and autonomy both add complexity to onboard systems, increasing the attack 
surface, and remove or reduce the human element. Suggested additions for cyberattack 
migration  can be found in Table 2 and the following bullet points. 
 
4.1.4.1: Reporting mechanisms for ship-based cyber incidents; 





 In conclusion, we present Tables 1 and 2 to demonstrate the wide scope and 
impacts of maritime cyber scenarios designed by the authors and how proposed policy 
can prevent or mitigate these attack scenarios if implemented. 
 
Table 2. Suggested policy that would prevent cyber incidents in proposed scenarios 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, maritime is clearly trailing other sectors in critical national infrastructure 
security and needs new approaches to regulation and training short term, and new 
systems long term. Unique factors in the shipping industry, particularly dynamic 
changes in maritime technology, economy, social, and environmental elements, present 
significant cybersecurity challenges to protect this critical international infrastructure.  
To address the global issue, the goal of this article was two-fold; first, to raise 
awareness and to provide insight on the possible scope and impacts of cyber 
vulnerabilities based on technology vulnerabilities, and second, to propose policy 
changes and additions to robustly improve maritime cybersecurity as a whole; from 
 Scenarios 
Policy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4.1.1.1: Jamming Training         
4.1.1.2: Robust Communication         
4.1.1.3: Physical/Cyber Lockdown         
4.1.2.1: Device Connections         
4.1.2.2: Device Charging         
4.1.2.3: Network/Device Separation         
4.1.3.1: Cyber Awareness Training         
4.1.3.2: Ship-Shore Interaction         
4.1.3.3: IT/OT Lines of Responsibility         
4.1.3.4: Cyber Reporting Alerts/Comms.         
4.1.4.1: Reporting Mechanisms         




cyber-physical to purely cybersecurity, today and for the near future.  The authors 
presented several plausible attack scenarios extrapolated from existing technological 
vulnerabilities and shipping operations and applied the concepts to ships. Using this 
wide range of potential maritime cyber scenarios, we demonstrate how the proposed 
policy amendments could serve to prevent and mitigate the undesired cyberattack 
outcomes in each of the scenarios.  We conclude that these policies can have significant, 
positive impact in real world situations in combating both known cyberthreats and some 
that have not yet occurred. 
Appendix  
Scenario 1: Malware on the bridge via USB  
During a voyage, several devices are plugged into the primary computer on the bridge 
of a cruise ship and the USB port on the ECDIS system.  In this scenario, the primary 
computer is separate from the ECDIS; however, they are often the same, which would 
have made this exploit even simpler. The devices connected include several USB 
drives, holding chart updates and miscellaneous documents, a few work smartphones 
and a digital camera for charging.  Hours later, key bridge systems start to lag, and the 
ECDIS screen finally goes static. The crew decide to wait until they reach port to 
address the problem, as they have a second working ECDIS as per regulation (ECDIS 
info 2018). Unfortunately, although the main computer seems unresponsive, the 
malware continues executing silently, stealing and transferring sensitive data. After a 
while however, the hacker grows disinterested or has achieved their goal and commands 
the malware to wipe itself off the systems before the ship can be thoroughly examined. 
 
Scenario 2: Software update attack on an autonomous ship  
In this scenario, an autonomous oil-carrier is wholly reliant on satellite-based 
connections to receive necessary software updates during its long voyages.  Securing 
the supply chain for the production, delivery, and use of all ship software is essential to 
maintaining trustworthy systems.  However, as this ship is autonomous with no human 
verification, one of minor updates was compromised to introduce a virus to the ship’s 
ultrasonic anemometer, a highly accurate wind measurer, and its wireless repeater.  
During the long voyage, the malware has the opportunity to spread to other systems if 





Scenario 3: Close proximity jamming aided with social engineering  
A private yacht is about to sail through a zone known for pirate activity.  It is suspected 
that this hotspot exists because it is close to a port that is a common rest stop for 
expensive yachts and the local government has few resources to deal with the levels of 
piracy activity. The yacht crew and passengers are alert and follow all safety protocols. 
However, at the edge of the known danger zone they lose GPS and both satellite- and 
radio-based communications like GMDSS.  Alarms that GPS has been lost alerted the 
crew to the situation but they are unable to call for help.  The officer of the watch 
suspects jammers are at work; however, the yacht is unable to sail out of range. 
 
Scenario 4: Shore-based jamming to prevent or delay operations 
A river ferry approaches its docking area during heavy peak commuter traffic.  Every 
ship in this company’s fleet had recently been upgraded with an automated mooring 
system to improve physical safety and operational efficiency, which has saved the 
company time and money so far.  However, when the radio remote is used to trigger the 
automated mooring gear, it does not engage. The crew is able to dock the ferry 
manually without damage; however, a number of passengers are upset and delays 
permeated throughout the morning. This scenario can also be expanded to represent port  
and ship-based interactions, as humans are only one type of cargo, and as there have 
been cases of hacking ports to smuggle goods (Pasternack 2013). This is not an 
unreasonable extrapolation.  
 
Scenario 5: Denial of sensor readings for critical operations 
A large newly outfitted ship is sailing through a narrow traffic zone after a refitting stop 
to replace several damaged sensors. While navigating a strait with several streams of 
shipping lanes, the captain gives a command with a new heading.  The helmsman 
attempts to follow the command, but the rudder angle reader is very slow to change, 
making it look like the rudder has becomes unresponsive or sluggish.  In a moment of 
confusion during a critical manoeuvre, the probability of a collision is fairly high and 






Scenario 6: Chokehold traffic jam  
It is estimated that in 2023 the first shipping tunnel will be open for cruises and freight 
ships (The Guardian 2017).  Based on previous incidences where power faults stopped 
trains in tunnels with significant outcomes (BBC 2014), we can postulate a scenario in 
which the attacker is able to stop a ship in the middle of the tunnel and stop all 
subsequent traffic.  In this scenario we hypothesize that the most effective way to 
achieve this would be to deny access to fuel by maliciously denying physical access or 
by preventing access to important data on the engine status, likely causing an 
emergency shutdown to prevent any disastrous outcomes such as an explosion.   
 
Scenario 7: GPS spoofing for small directional drift  
Producing massive containers (e.g. Triple-E class) is becoming more common.  In this 
scenario a well-known shipbuilder received a contract to deliver several new container 
ships.  However, just prior to release, one ship has an incident with light damage when 
it went slightly off course and made contact with a shallow sandbank. Although the 
shipbuilding company quickly discovered and disclosed that the cyberattack was caused 
by a third-party device, one they quickly removed from the rest of their fleet, enough 
reputation damage had been dealt.  As a result, other competing companies were able to 
improve their own position in the market. 
 
Scenario 8: AIS misdirection by spoofing eAtoNs 
A bulk carrier enters a foggy bay, guided by a series of virtual buoys.  Because the local 
weather often creates low visibility, eAtoN have been attached to the location of bridge 
piles and other water level obstructions in the bay to lower the probability of collisions 
(Terdiman 2014).   Despite AIS readings saying the ship had large margins from all 
obstacles, the ship trajectory seemed to pass very close to one of the bridge’s piles.  The 
trained crew realise that the AIS data was inaccurate and decide to slow down and 
navigate entirely by SONAR. However, they do not communicate to others what had 
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